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SUIT PREDICATED UPON

TIONAL OR GROSSLY NEGLIGENT CONDUCT-Small

INTEN-

v. Rockfeld,

66

N.J. 231, 330 A.2d 335 (1974).
In December of 1972, Linda Rockfeld, then five months pregnant, joined her husband, Dr. Robert Rockfeld, on a journey to
Florida where they embarked on a motorboat trip in the Gulf of
Mexico. 1 After having difficulty with the motor and drifting for
some time, the couple attempted to swim towards shore, even
though the waters were shark-infested and Linda was somewhat
incapacitated due to her pregnancy. Dr. Rockfeld returned safely
to shore but his wife's body was never recovered. 2 Some months
later, Linda Rockfeld was declared dead 3 and Robert Rockfeld was
appointed general administrator of her estate, which was valued at
4
approximately $750,000 and represented a gift from her parents.
Subsequently, Linda's mother, Mrs. Clara Small, as administratrix ad prosequendum, instituted a wrongful death action
against Dr. Rockfeld for the benefit of the Rockfelds' minor son,
Scott.5 The complaint alleged that Dr. Rockfeld had deliberately
planned to kill his wife, that his actions were the proximate cause
of her death, and, alternatively, that he had conducted himself "in
'wanton, reckless disregard' of her safety."6 Thereafter, defendant
Rockfeld moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
the action "was 'barred by operation of the interspousal and inSmall v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 234, 330 A.2d 335, 337 (1974).
2 Id.

3 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 330 A.2d 335 (1974)
(quoting from Transcript of Hearing, May 14, 1973, at 171) [hereinafter cited as Brief of
Appellant].
In the superior court hearing in which Dr. Rockfeld had sought a declaration of death, the
judge stated that his decision was not to be construed as making any ruling as to the cause of Mrs.
Rockfeld's death, because" '[]or one thingwe have the water;foranother... the wind... the waves and
barracudaand sharks andfinally ... Dr. Rockfeld hinef.' "Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added in Brief). He
added only "'that the presumption of life [had] been overcome.' " Id. at 4.
Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 235, 330 A.2d 335, 337 (1974).
5 Id. at 233, 246, 330 A.2d at 336, 344. Recovery of damages in a wrongful death action is
"for the exclusive benefit" of those entitled to share in the intestate distribution of the decedent's
personal property. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-4 (Supp. 1975-76). If any of such persons, however,
"were dependent on the decedent at his death," they are the sole beneficiaries of the damages.
Id.
6 Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231,234,330 A.2d 335,337 (1974). The plaintiff asserted that
Dr. Rockfeld knew that his wife was pregnant, a poor swimmer, and therefore incapacitated;
that he failed to check the motorboat's equipment, to secure life preservers, and to check
deteriorating weather conditions; and that after causing her to leave the boat and enter
shark-infested waters, "he'deserted and abandoned [her] ... and returned to safety alone.' "Id.
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trafamilial immunity doctrines.'
Reluctantly, the trial judge
granted the defendant's motion 8 and plaintiff appealed. 9 While the
action was pending hearing in the appellate division, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey granted certification,' 0 with defendant conceding that the appeal presented " 'solely' " a question of law."'
In Small v. Rockfeld, 1 2 the supreme court reversed, holding that
the wrongful death action was not precluded by the operation of
either interspousal or parent-child immunity."3 In arriving at this
result, the court relied on recent New Jersey decisions in which the
supreme court had abrogated immunity in the limited context of
automobile negligence actions and had established that the policy
considerations usually advanced to support intra-family immunity,
were no longer valid in all situations.' 4 The Small court inferred
that such prior case law had intended to restrict operation of the
interspousal immunity to situations involving either "marital relationship privilege or simple domestic negligence."' 5 Similarly, the
Small court determined that the supreme court had considered
parental immunity operable only in those limited circumstances
"where exercise of parental authority and adequacy of child care"
were in issue." 6 Concluding that none of these circumstances were
present in the case before it, the Small court found no justification for
permitting either type of intra-family immunity to act as a bar in Dr.
",7

7 Id. at 233, 330 A.2d at 337. A wrongful death action is permitted

[w]hen the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default, such as
would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the person injured to maintain an action
for damages resulting from the injury ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1 (1952). Defendant was clearly predicating the defense of interspousal immunity on the theory that an action would have been precluded had his wife survived
and thus should be presently barred. For a discussion of this question see note 79 infra.
The issue of parental immunity arose because the wrongful death action was, in essence, a
suit for the benefit of the minor child. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-4 (Supp. 1975-76).
' Small v. Rockfeld, No. L-27834-72 at 3 (Essex County Ct., Dec. 11, 1973).
In his unpublished opinion, Judge Harrison noted that while he felt constrained to grant
the motion because of prior NewJersey law, it would be incongruous in this situation to permit a
husband to insulate himself from liability on the premise of maintaining family harmony when
the action was predicated on an intentional tort and brought on behalf of the deceased wife's
estate. Id. at 2-3. He further stated that the facts presented "the ultimate test" in which to
determine the viability of intra-family tort immunity. Id. at 1.
a Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 234, 330 A.2d 335, 337 (1074).
10 Small v. Rockfeld, 65 N.J. 579, 325 A.2d 713 (1974).
"
Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 236, 330 A.2d 335, 338 (1974).
12 66 N.J. 231, 330 A.2d 335 (1974).
'3
Id. at 241, 244, 246-48, 330 A.2d at 341, 343-45.
14 Id. at 240-41, 243-44, 330 A.2d at 340-43.
15 Id. at 241, 330 A.2d at 341.
16 Id. at 244, 330 A.2d at 343.
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Rockfeld's favor."7 Although the extent to which the court intended
to abrogate the immunities is unclear, the effect of Small is to
substantially diminish the vitality of both immunity doctrines.
The two distinct doctrines which have barred personal injury
suits between family members are both of judicial origin. Interspousal immunity-the bar to suits between husband and wife-has
a historical basis in English common law and originally depended
on the unity theory for its support.1 8 Under this concept, the wife
had no separate legal existence with respect to personal and property rights inasmuch as her legal identity was deemed merged with
that of her husband.' 9 Consequently, an action could neither be
maintained nor defended in the name of a wife alone, but required
that her husband be joined as a party.2 0 The result was that interspousal suits were barred since in any such action the husband
2
would, of necessity, be both plaintiff and defendant. '
By the eighteenth century, equity courts had come to recognize the concept of a married woman's separate estate and thus
permitted a wife to institute various property actions against her
husband.22 The major advancement in the status of married women, however, occurred in the mid-nineteenth century with the
advent of legislation enacted in all jurisdictions which recognized a
wife's separate legal existence. 23 Although these Married Women's
Acts inferentially destroyed the unity fiction, their effect on interspousal tort suits has been the subject of controversy in many
jurisdictions. 24- The New Jersey Married Persons Act, 2 5 for in17 Id. at 241, 244, 246-47, 330 A.2d at 341, 343-44.
1s 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442. See also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 122, at 859-60 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER].
"9W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 122, at 859-60. One eminent commentator has noted that
while the merger of identity has played a significant role in determining spousal jural
relationships, it is "[alt most... a useful phrase to sum up a result in certain cases" because it was
not always applicable in "courts administering a law different from the common law." McCurdy,
Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1035 (1930).
20 McCurdy, supra note 19, at 1032.
21 Id. at 1033.
22 Id. at 1035. The equity courts imposed a trust upon any interests acquired by a
husband in "existing property ... settled upon a married woman to her sole and separate
use free of the interference and control of her husband," thereby permitting suits by a wife
whose equitable rights had been interfered with by her husband. Id.
23 W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 122, at 861; McCurdy, supra note 19, at 1036-37.
24 W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 122, at 861-63; McCurdy, supra note 19, at 1042-50.
Dean Prosser asserts that in a large number of jurisdictions courts have refused to construe
such statutes to allow personal tort actions between spouses. W. PROSSER, supra at 861-62.
Due to the statutes' effect on the unity concept, however, those courts have also felt a need
to bolster their decisions with newer policy arguments, such as the fear of fraudulent claims
and the desire to maintain family harmony, which have tended to rest on "precarious"
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stance, provides: "Nothing in this chapter . ..shall enable a husband or wife to . . . sue each other, except as heretofore, and
except as authorized by this chapter. '2 6 This provision, which has
served since its enactment as the basis for the doctrine of interspousal immunity, has generated a wide divergence of judicial
opinion with respect to its effect on the maintenance of interspousal
tort actions.
For example, in Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp.,2 7 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey construed this statutory language as providing
that a right of action based on an antenuptial tort was extinguished
by the plaintiffs subsequent marriage to the defendant. 28 The
holding was predicated on the court's perception that the statute
was intended to bar any suit commenced between spouses, regardless of the parties' status at the time the cause of action arose.29 In
reaching its conclusion, the court did not assess the validity of the
policies underlying the immunity doctrine, but rested its analysis
upon the premise that the common law immunity doctrine had
been incorporated into the Married Persons Act.3 0 Therefore,
ground. Id. at 862-63. Exceptions to the immunity have therefore been created in some
situations. Id. at 863-64. See, e.g., Steele v. Steele, 65 F. Supp. 329 (D.D.C. 1946) (divorce);
Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962) (physical attack); Shumway
v. Nelson, 259 Minn. 319, 107 N.W.2d 531 (1961) (wrongful death); Morin v. Letourneau,
102 N.H. 309, 156 A.2d 131 (1959) (antenuptial tort); Sanchez v. Olivarez, 94 N.J. Super.
61, 226 A.2d 752 (L. Div. 1967) (divorce); Juaire v.Juaire, 128 Vt. 149,259 A.2d 786 (1969)
(antenuptial tort actionable in equity).
It has been suggested that absent "strong countervailing social interests," courts should
focus their attention on the injury inflicted rather than on the status of the wrongful party.
Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts, 10 CALIF. L. REV. 461, 480
(1922).
N.J. STA-r. ANN. § 37:2-1 et seq. (1968).
26 Id. § 37:2-5. In Kennedy v. Camp, 14 N.J. 390, 102 A.2d 595 (1954), this provision
2

was interpreted to mean that the spousal "unity of interest ... [had] not been altered," and
therefore, interspousal tort claims were not sustainable. Id. at 397, 102 A.2d at 599. In
Kennedy, a counterclaim had been instituted against a husband-plaintiff, alleging that he was
jointly liable with the original defendant for his negligence in causing the automobile
accident in which the wife-plaintiff was injured. Id. at 394-95, 102 A.2d at 598. Barring the
defendant's subsequent contribution claim, the court reasoned that he could have no right
against the husband, since under the New Jersey statute governing contribution there must
be both joint wrongdoing and joint liability. However, in Kennedy, there could be no joint
liability because the husband was immune from suit by his wife. Furthermore, the court
maintained that to construe the contribution statute as allowing such a claim would render
the husband's immunity meaningless, for it would permit indirect action where direct action
was barred. Id. at 397-98, 102 A.2d at 599.
27 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958).
28 Id. at 7, 12, 141 A.2d at 37-38, 41.
29 Id. at 7-8, 141 A.2d at 38.
30 Id. at 6-7, 141 A.2d at 37. One commentator has suggested that the immunity
doctrine, because itrested on the unity concept, was destroyed with that concept by the New
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reasoned the court, any attempt to abrogate the immunity must be
31
forthcoming from the legislature.
The majority result in Koplik was reached over the strong
objection of three justices, who vigorously advocated the termination of interspousal immunity. 32 The dissenting justices were cognizant of the fact that the justification generally advanced in support of the immunity had shifted from the "fanciful" unity concept
toward the theory "that the husband's immunity serves to preserve
domestic tranquillity and tends to avoid fraudulent and collusive
actions. ' 33 The dissent not only disputed the validity of these
rationales, 34 but also criticized the majority's deference to the legislature by refuting the majority's assertion that the common law
immunity had been incorporated into the statute. 35 Rather, the
dissent perceived that the statutory provision had "left the common
law intact" and therefore, the immunity was as susceptible to 'judicial alteration" as were other common law doctrines which had
outlived their usefulness.

36

Subsequently, the supreme court examined the policies underlying the immunity doctrine in Long v. Landy. 37 Therein the court
unanimously held that a wife could sue the estate of her deceased
husband for personal injuries which she had sustained when the
automobile driven by him collided with another vehicle.38 While
Jersey Married Persons Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-1 et seq. (1968). Therefore, it was only the
limiting provision of the Act which saved the immunity at all, although only as part of ajudicially
created and alterable common law. Note, InterspousalImmunity Held Unavailableas a Defense to
Tort Liability in Automobile Accident Case, 3 RPrGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 183, 185 (1971).
31 27 N.J. at 12-13, 141 A.2d at 41.
32 Id. at 13-18, 141 A.2d at 41-44 (Jacobs, J., dissenting, joined by Weintraub, C.J., &
Wachenfeld, J.).
The justices reasoned that particularly in antenuptial tort situations, the immunity
should not bar suits since the statutory language clearly indicated that an antenuptial cause
of action was the wife's separate personal property and any action which she commenced
before marriage was to continue unabated until the rendering of final judgment
" 'notwithstanding such marriage."' Id. at 20, 141 A.2d at 45 (quoting from N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 37:2-7 (1937)).
33 27 N.J. at 14, 141 A.2d at 42.
34 Id. at 14-18, 141 A.2d at 4244. One historically based argument which the dissent
did not address is the notion that if the wrongs committed by one spouse are substantial
enough to provoke legal interest, the violated rights can be redressed by the invocation of
either criminal or divorce proceedings. However, as noted by Dean Prosser, neither remedy
"compensates for the damage done, or covers all the torts that may be committed." W.
PROSSER, supra note 18, § 122, at 862-63 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Courtney v. Courtney,
184 Okla. 395, 401, 87 P.2d 660, 666 (1938). It should be noted, too, that by their very
nature these "remedies" must disrupt domestic tranquility.
35 27 N.J. at 18-19, 141 A.2d at 44.
36 Id. at 19, 141 A.2d at 44.
37 35 N.J. 44, 171 A.2d 1 (1961).
38 Id. at 53, 171 A.2d at 6.
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the court might have reached this result solely on the ground that
the unity concept was terminated by the death of one of the
spouses, 39 it chose instead to go further and assess the applicability
of the other policy rationales. Motivating the court to expand its
analysis was an awareness that although the Married Persons Act
insulates one spouse from negligence actions instituted by the
other spouse, such suits should be barred only "during the exis40
tence of the reasons which underlie the common law doctrine.
Since both the fear of marital disharmony and the threat of collusion were negated by one spouse's demise, any policy consideration
that could support the operation of immunity in Long no longer
existed. 4 By focusing on the rationales upon which the immunity
doctrine had been predicated, the court not only undermined the
theory advanced in Koplik-that the immunity had been incorporated into the statute-but also foreshadowed the analysis it would
subsequently employ when it partially abrogated the doctrine in

4
Immer v. Risko.

2

In Immer, the plaintiff commenced an action to recover for
injuries she had received in an automobile collision, naming as one
43
defendant the driver of the vehicle in which she was a passenger.
She subsequently married that defendant who then moved for
summary judgment on the basis that the suit was precluded by
operation of the interspousal immunity doctrine. 44 The trial court
granted the motion and the appellate division affirmed, feeling
constrained to follow Koplik. 45 The supreme court reversed, determining that the operation of interspousal immunity in au46
tomobile negligence actions "has no place in our modern society.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court engaged in an analysis
of the reasons for the immunity, noting that the most frequently
asserted justifications had been the desire to preserve family harmony and to protect against collusive suits. 4 7 However, it found

that neither rationale was sufficiently compelling to warrant a con48
tinuation of interspousal immunity in all situations.
In refuting the assumption that interspousal tort actions would
39 Id. at 51, 171 A.2d at 5.
40 Id. at 50, 171 A.2d at 4.

41 Id.
42 56
'3 Id.
44 Id.
4. Id.
41 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.

at 53, 171 A.2d at 6.
N.J. 482, 487, 267 A.2d 481, 483 (1970).
at 483, 267 A.2d at 481.
at
at
at
at

483,
485,
488,
490,

267 A.2d at 481-82.
495, 267 A.2d at 482, 488.
267 A.2d at 484.
493, 267 A.2d at 485, 487.
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inevitably result in a disruption of family harmony, the court noted
that in the absence of insurance, the maintenance of a negligence
suit was more likely a reflection of existing disharmony than the
impetus for future dissension. 49 Furthermore, the court perceived
no sound reason for fearing that marital discord would be created
to any greater degree by adjudications in automobile negligence
cases than in property or contract actions which were already
maintainable. 50 The court placed its greatest reliance, however,
upon the realities of automobile insurance coverage. In its view,
the existence of "insurance militate[d] against the possibility that"
marital harmony would be adversely affected
since there would be
51
resources.
family
draining
of
no danger
The court, nevertheless, was cognizant that the presence of
liability insurance had given rise to the second rationale for preserving the immunity-the increased fear of collusive suits. 52 However, this rationale was viewed as inherently inequitable because of
the obvious injustice in "deny[ing] the claims of the many because
of the potentiality for fraud by the few. 15 3 Furthermore, by accepting this rationale, a court would be tacitly admitting that juries are
not competent to distinguish legitimate claims from those that are
49 Id. at 488, 267 A.2d at 484.

-0 Id. at 488-89, 267 A.2d at 484. Some actions between spouses have been entertained
because of the operation of equitable principles, as in the enforcement of postnuptial
agreements "to prevent an unconscionable advantage by one party over the other." Bendler
v. Bendler, 3 N.J. 161, 169, 69 A.2d 302, 306 (1949). Other principles have similarly
motivated courts to carve out exceptions to the immunity doctrine. For instance, a wife has
been allowed to sue her husband's employer based on the doctrine of respondeat superior,
even though it is recognized that the husband may subsequently be called upon to indemnify
the employer. Hudson v. Gas Consumers' Ass'n, 123 N.J.L. 252, 252, 254-55, 8 A.2d 337,
338-39 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939). Although in some jurisdictions the view had been to disallow
such claims, the New Jersey court found them to be cognizable since "[t]he plaintiffs right to
sue an employer.., is an independent, primary right and not... dependent upon the right
to sue the servant." Id. at 254-55, 8 A.2d at 338-39. See also Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon
Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928). The Immer court perceived, however, that the real reason
to allow such actions was that since the employer was likely to carry liability insurance, he would
expect no reimbursement from the employee and consequently pose no danger of draining
family resources. 56 N.J. at 492-93, 267 A.2d at 486-87.
51 56 N.J. at 489, 267 A.2d at 484-85.
52 Id. at 489, 267 A.2d at 485. An indication of the seriousness with which collusive suits
have been feared is the New York enactment which stipulates that there must be an express
provision in the contract of insurance by which the carrier agrees to cover the insured's
spouse, or the carrier will be deemed as having refused to assume the liability. N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 167(3) (McKinney 1966). For an extended analysis of this provision and its relation to the
new loss-apportionment and no-fault concepts in New York see Comment, Yet To Ripen
Fruits of The Dole Tree--Statutory Spousal Immunity and Negligent Parental Supervision, 38
ALBANY L. REv. 407, 408-31 (1974).
53 56 N.J. at 495, 267 A.2d at 488.
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fraudulent. 54 Consequently, the Immer court asserted its faith in the
fact that compensation would not likely be awarded to undeserving parties. 55
Despite its conclusion that the underlying policies advanced to
support interspousal immunity were no longer viable to preclude
this action, the court explicitly limited its abrogation of the immunity to claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents.5 6 The court
recognized that there were still areas within the spousal relationship which should remain non-litigable but declined to define the
57
scope of those areas.
In contrast to the interspousal immunity doctrine, the doctrine
of parent-child immunity has American rather than English common law roots.5" The first reported decision in the United States to
judicially recognize the immunity was an 1891 Mississippi case,
Hewlett v. George,5 9 which held that an unemancipated minor
daughter who had been falsely imprisoned by her mother, could
not maintain an action against her mother for the intentional
tort. 60 Citing no authority, the court asserted that "[t]he peace of

society, and of the families composing society" required that no
right of action be recognized in favor of the injured child. 6' This
-4 Id. at 494, 267 A.2d at 487. It has been noted that "[o]nce that concept were accepted,
then all causes of action should be abolished." Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 696, 376 P.2d 70,
73, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 105 (1962).
11 See 56 N.J. at 494, 267 A.2d at 487. The court pointed out that the closer the
relationship of the parties, the greater the threat of collusion. Id. at 490, 267 A.2d at 485. It
then analogized to the judiciary's experience with cases involving "the host-guest relationship" and concluded that while the interspousal relationship "is not strictly analogous," the
host-guest claims have established that courts are able to deal effectively with claims in which
the threat of fraud is great. Id. at 492, 267 A.2d at 486.
-6 Id. at 495, 267 A.2d at 488.
57 Id.
58 See, e.g., Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 354-55, 150 A. 905, 906 (1930). The
parent-child immunity has been recognized primarily to ensure the proper rearing of
children. For an excellent development of the history of the parent-child immunity see
Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband & Wife-Parent & Child, 26
Mo. L. REV. 152, 180-211 (1961).
59 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). See Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 426-27, 142 N.W.2d
66, 71 (1966).
60 68 Miss. at 704, 711, 9 So. at 887.
11 Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887. It is important to recognize that the holding denied only "a
right to ...civil redress for personal injuries." Id. This was probably based on the idea that
the law could intercede on behalf of the child on the basis of parens patriae; his custody
could be changed; his property interests would be protected; and ultimately the criminal
laws were operable. See Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 85, 145 A. 753, 755 (1929);
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 363, 150 A. 905, 910 (1930); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111
Tenn. 388, 389-91, 77 S.W. 664, 664 (1903). These remedies, however, might well be
insufficient. See Comment, supra note 58, at 191-92.
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bar was promptly applied in two other jurisdictions, 62 so that by the
beginning of the twentieth century these "cases constitute[d] the
great trilogy upon which the American rule of parent-child tort
63
immunity [was] based.
The doctrine was not adopted by New Jersey's highest court
until 1935 in Reingold v. Reingold,6 4 in which the court addressed
the specific question of whether an emancipated child could sue
her father for injuries sustained in an automobile accident which
occurred before her emancipation. 65 Stating that the case was one
of first impression in New Jersey, the court adopted what it saw as
the preferable majority view-that, on the basis of maintaining
peace within the family, "an unemancipated infant may not sue
parents, in tort, for . . . negligence which occurred during such
infancy. ' 66 The same rationale-preservation of family harmonycompelled the court to deny a right of action to the now emancipated
child .67

The immunity adopted in Reingold was subsequently applied in
Hastings v. Hastings68 to preclude a suit instituted by an unemancipated child against her father to recover for injuries resulting from
"his simple negligence in the driving of an automobile. ' 69 Notwithstanding the father's insurance coverage, the trial court disallowed the action. 70 The supreme court affirmed, emphasizing that
strong public policies mandated its conclusion. 71 Of paramount
importance, again, was the serious threat to family harmony that
intra-family suits predicated on actions of simple negligence would
62 McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (suit against father and
stepmother for stepmother's cruel and inhuman treatment of child); Roller v. Roller, 37
Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (suit against father by daughter for rape).
63 Comment, supra note 58, at 182.
64 115 N.J.L. 532, 181 A. 153 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935). Some lower New Jersey courts,
however, had previously relied on the doctrine.See Goheen v. Goheen, 9 N.J. Misc. 507, 154
A. 393 (Union County Cir. Ct. 1931) (unemancipated child not entitled to maintain action
against father for injury arising out of automobile accident); Damiano v. Damiano, 6 N.J.
Misc. 849, 143 A. 3 (Essex County Cir. Ct. 1928) (administrator of deceased children's estate
barred from seeking judgment under Wrongful Death Act from mother who had allegedly
caused their injuries); Mannion v. Mannion, 3 N.J. Misc. 68, 129 A. 431 (Hudson County
Cir. Ct. 1925) (unemancipated child barred from suing parent for negligent injury).
65 115 N.J.L. at 533, 181 A. at 154.
6 Id. at 537, 181 A. at 156.
67 Id. The court reasoned that since no recognized cause of action accrued to the infant
at the time of the accident, "the majority and emancipation of the child could not, and did
not, create a non-existent cause of action." Id.
68 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960).
69 Id. at 248, 163 A.2d at 148.
70Id. at 249, 163 A.2d at 148.
71 Id. at 250, 253, 163 A.2d at 149-50.
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pose. 72 Additionally, the fear of fraudulent and collusive suits was
a consideration strongly relied upon. 73 As the court noted, the parent
to be sued would be involved in making the decision of whether the
child should institute the action and "when the insured's own flesh
and blood and the family pocketbook are concerned" the temptation
to defraud the insurance carrier would be great.7 4
Justice Jacobs, joined by Chief Justice Weintraub and Justice
Schettino, vigorously dissented, pointing out that no sound policy
reasons existed to deny an injured child the right to sue a parent
"fully covered by automobile liability insurance. ' 75 The justices
perceived that such litigation might promote, rather than disrupt,
family harmony 7 6 and that while collusive actions might occasionally be instituted, the court system could be depended upon to
weed them out. 77 The dissenters stressed the fact that other juris-

dictions had recognized the harshness of the rule and had moved
away from it, at least in situations where, as here, parental authority was not in issue. 78 Therefore, the justices concluded that in
automobile accident cases "fair and just application of the fundamental common law duty of due care, with tort liability for its
79
breach" was called for, regardless of the parties' family relation.
Ultimately, in France v. A. P. A. Transport Corp.,8 0 the court
72

Id. at 251-52, 163 A.2d at 149-50.

73 Id. at 252-53, 163 A.2d at 150.
74 Id. at 252, 163 A.2d at 150.
75 Id. at 256, 163 A.2d at 152.
76 Id. at 256-57, 163 A.2d at 152-53. The dissent emphasized that a suit instituted against a
fully insured parent would pose no economic threat to the parent and would, therefore,
generate no adversity between child and parent. Id.
77 Id. at 257, 163 A.2d at 153.
78 Id. at 256-61, 163 A.2d at 152-53. The dissent also asserted that it was difficult to justify
the allowance of contract and property actions but to disallow suits "where a greater right-T'he
right of physical integrity'-is involved." Id. at 259, 163 A.2d at 154.
79 Id. at 261, 163 A.2d at 155. Hastingswas subsequently followed in Heyman v. Gordon, 40
N.J. 52, 190 A.2d 670 (1963), and Franco v. Davis, 51 N.J. 237, 239 A.2d 1 (1968), with the same
justices dissenting in each case. 40 N.J. at 60, 190 A.2d at 674; 51 N.J. at 243, 239 A.2d at 4.
While both suits arose out of automobile accidents, theHeyman cause of action had its basis in the
Wrongful Death Act. 40 N.J. at 53, 190 A.2d at 670-7 1. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1 et seq.
(1952). The court, however, did not address itself to a construction of the wrongful death
statute, since it disposed of the claims by determining that parental immunity would operate to
bar a claim against the father by plaintiff children for his alleged negligence in the accident
which caused their mother's death. 40 N.J. at 53-54, 190 A.2d at 671. The court in Small
similarly circumvented a question of statutory construction, although its basis for doing so was
that no immunity existed under the alleged facts. 66 N.J. at 236, 330 A.2d at 338. Thus, an
unresolved question in New Jersey is whether the proviso, indicating that a cause of action
inures to the administratrix ad prosequendum if the decedent "would have been entitled to
maintain an action" had he lived, "pertainsonly to theelementsin thetortitself... or... extends
to personal immunities as well." Id.
80 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970).
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adopted the dissenters' reasoning to permit an action by an unemancipated child for injuries sustained in an automobile accident.8 1 The court noted that parental immunity was initially based
on the idea of preserving family harmony but that the aspect of
fraud and collusion had more recently been emphasized. 8 2 Asserting that these rationales had been rejected in the companion case
of Immer, the court found that rejection "equally applicable here,"
and refused "to continue a prophylactic rule which indiscriminately
bars all claims. 8 3a The court also noted that irreconcilable exceptions to parental immunity had developed,8 4 and that a growing
number of jurisdictions had eliminated the doctrine, at least in
motor vehicle cases. 8 5 While the court recognized that there were
"areas involving the exercise of parental authority and care over a
child which should not be justiciable in a court of law," it declined
to "speculate on [the] limits" of its abrogation of the immunity, and
held only that in the future, suits between parents and children
86
would be allowed in motor vehicle negligence cases.
81 Id. at 502, 507, 267 A.2d at 491, 494.
82 Id. at 505, 267 A.2d at 493.
83 Id.

84 Id. at 504-05, 267 A.2d at 492-93. The development of such exceptions has been
attributed to judicial hostility to the harshness of the rule. See, e.g., Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d
402, 410, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963). A contrary opinion has been asserted by a dissenting
Arizona judge who viewed the
continued engraftment of exceptions on the application of any rule to be normal,
judicial procedure. Judicial exceptions are equally compatible with the concept of
improvement as they are with destruction.
Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 94, 471 P.2d 282, 290 (1970) (McFarland, J., dissenting).
In New Jersey many exceptions have been recognized: Minors have been allowed to sue
their parents' employer, Radelicki v. Travis, 39 N.J. Super. 263, 266, 120 A.2d 774, 775 (App.
Div. 1956); to maintain actions for a parent's breach of fiduciary obligation, In re Flasch, 51 N.J.
Super. 1, 29, 143 A.2d 208, 223 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 28 N.J. 35, 144 A.2d 736 (1958);
to sue their grandparents though they stood in loco parentis, Wilkins v. Kane, 74 N.J. Super. 414,
416, 181 A.2d 417, 418 (L. Div. 1962); and to sue their parent's estate for personal injuries,
Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. Super. 294, 299, 176 A.2d 818, 820-21 (L. Div. 1962). It must be
noted, however, that prior to Small, the right to bring a wrongful death action was denied when
a child attempted to sue a living tortfeasor parent. Heyman v. Gordon, 40 N.J. 52, 54, 190 A.2d
670, 671 (1963); Tharp v. Shannon, 95 N.J. Super. 298, 304-07,230 A.2d 902, 905-06 (L. Div.
1967).
85 56 N.J. at 506-07, 267 A.2d at 493-94. See, e.g., Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86,471 P.2d
282 (1970); Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1969);
Schenk v. Schenk, 100 111. App. 2d 199,241 N.E.2d 12 (1968); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431,
161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Gelbman v.
Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa.
372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
86 56 N.J. at 507, 267 A.2d at 494. In Di Martino v. Ventrella, 123 N.J. Super. 128, 301
A.2d 777 (L. Div. 1973), France was narrowly interpreted to preclude an action by parents
against their unemancipated son for his negligent operation of an automobile, Id. at 132, 301
A.2d at 779. The supreme court expressly overruled this holding in Guterman v. Guterman, 66
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Thus, when Small was decided, the policy reasons which had
supplied support for both interspousal and parental immunity had
already been questioned and largely rejected by Immer and France.
Those holdings were expressly limited to automobile accident
cases, however, and the prevalence of liability insurance had played
a significant role in the court's reasoning. 7 The Small court,
nevertheless, found Immer and France determinative of the immunity claims before it, even though Small was based on allegations of
intentional and gross negligence and no insurance coverage was in
issue. 88 The court observed that the Immer majority had
considered the interspousal immunity to have been effectively
terminated in our State in situations, such as the one at hand,
that are unconcerned with any
marital relationship privilege or
89
simple domestic negligence.

This interpretation enabled the court to find that the interspousal
immunity could not operate as an affirmative defense in Dr.
Rockfeld's favor and thus bar the wrongful death action instituted
by the administratrix ad prosequendum.9 °
N.J. 69, 328 A.2d 233 (1974), on the theory that nothing in France warranted such a restrictive
application. Id. at 71, 328 A.2d at 234.
It is interesting to note that subsequent to France and Immner, NewJersey has been viewed as
having completely abrogated the intra-family immunities. See W. PRossEi,supra note 18, § 122,
at 864 & n.61, 867-68 & n.99. See, e. g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 922-23, 479 P.2d 648,
653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (197 1) (wherein France is cited in this context). It may be that the
court's failure in both cases to define precise limits of its abrogation gave rise to this
misinterpretation.
" See 56 N.J. at 489-90, 267 A.2d at 484-85; 56 N.J. at 505, 507, 267 A.2d at 493-94.
88 66 N.J. at 234, 241, 244, 330 A.2d at 337, 341, 343. The plaintiff in Small argued that
nothing in New Jersey law suggested that the intra-family immunities were meant to apply to
situations in which the tortious conduct could be characterized as intentional or grossly
negligent. Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 10. See Note, I U. NEWARK L. REV. 97, 98
(1936). But see Notare v. Notare, 64 N.J. Super. 589, 594, 166 A.2d 816, 819 (App. Div.
1960). In Notare, the court disallowed an automobile negligence action by a child against his
father on the ground that the father's alleged misconduct amounted to no more than
"simple negligence" although the complaint had alleged wanton and willful behavior. Id. at
590-91, 594-95, 166 A.2d at 817, 819. Though this "simple negligence" holding unquestionably brought the facts within the rule enunciated in Reingold, the court also stated:
Nothing in Reingold or Hastings suggests that on a charge of "willful or wanton"
negligence a different rule should be applied; in fact, the comprehensive holding in
Reingold bars such an action as is presented . . . in the instant case. Our highest
court has not adopted any different rule and it is not the function of this court to
do so.
Id. at 594-95, 166 A.2d at 819.
89 66 N.J. at 241, 330 A.2d at 341.
90 Id. The court also discussed whether plaintiff, if the adjudication of the wrongful
death claim were decided in her favor, could subsequently seek the imposition of a constructive trust on the third of the estate to which the defendant had succeeded. The majority
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In tracing the development of the parental immunity doctrine,
the court noted the myriad exceptions to the doctrine and the many
decisions in otherjurisdictions which had abrogated the immunity, at
least in part. 91 Discussing areas within the parent-child relationship
which should remain non-justiciable, the court asserted that those
areas had been considered as well by the France court and similarly
concluded that the areas concerned "customary care and discipline." 92 Since those areas were not relevant in light of the misconduct
alleged in the complaint, the court would not bar the action on the
ground of parental immunity. 9 3 The Small court viewed its holding as
a reassertion of the Francecourt's termination of immunity "in situations ...where exercise of parental authority and adequacy of child
care are admittedly not matters in issue,' 94 and specifically held that
95
the action "should not have been barred at the threshold.

The court buttressed this conclusion by emphasizing that it was
96
mandated not only by precedent but also by policy considerations.
Finding that the suit presented neither a threat of collusion nor the
fear of additional family disruption, the court found no justification
97
for suppressing the truth which would emerge during the litigation.
suggested that although constructive trusts are usually imposed on the basis of criminal
conviction, other than criminal proof might "suffice," in this type of situation. Id. at 245, 330
A.2d at 343. Case law appears to indicate that the real consideration is whether the
decedent's death was caused by an intentional act of the beneficiary on whom plaintiff seeks
to have the trust imposed. Jackson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 106 N.J. Super. 61,
68-73, 254 A.2d 141, 144-47 (L. Div. 1969).
91 66 N.J. at 242, 330 A.2d at 341-42. As stated by the Court of Appeals of New York:
The thread common to the exceptions was that the family relation, in the eyes of
the law, had terminated (in the case of emancipation or legal age), been abandoned
(in the case of intentionally inflicted injury), or was logically irrelevant to the alleged
wrong (in the case of contract, property damage or injury in the course of employment).
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 43, 324 N.E.2d 338, 342, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 865 (1974).
Exceptions to parent-child immunity have been recognized in the following cases: Emery v.
Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (willful misconduct in driving automobile);
Carricato v. Carricato, 384 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1964) (emancipated child); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930) (employer-father's insurance covers son injured as
employee); Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 503, 50 S.E.2d 540 (1948) (child against parent's
employer); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952) (suit against partnership
in which father was one of the partners); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445
(1950) (drunken driving by parent); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952)
(injury to child not referable to parent-child relationship). For a more exhaustive discussion
of the exceptions to parent-child immunity see Comment, Child v. Parent: Erosion of the
Immunity Rule, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 201 (1967).
92 66 N.J. at 244, 330 A.2d at 343.
93 Id.

94 Id.
95 Id. at 246, 330 A.2d at 344.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 247, 330 A.2d at 344. In assessing the effect that adjudication of the wrongful
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Thus, the court was able to resolve the immunity questions
before it by relying on precedent 98 and assessing the relevance of
the policy considerations underlying the immunities. However, it
avoided dealing with questions which were not directly in issue, 99
thereby exhibiting a reluctance to define the limits for what has been
described as an "almost total abrogation" of the intra-family immudeath claim would have on the child, who at the time of the appeal was in his father's
custody and residing with his father's relatives, the court concluded that in the end the truth
which will emerge would be in the child's best interest. See id. at 235, 247, 330 A.2d at 337,
344. The court stated that if there is a judgment adverse to the father, "the child's interests
may be in critical need of additional protection and further proceedings may justly be
undertaken." Id. at 247, 330 A.2d at 344. Inherent in this statement, however, is a contradiction of the majority's reasoning that family harmony would not be further disrupted by the
allowance of the action. See id.
It was upon precisely this issue of family harmony that the dissenters vehemently
disagreed with the majority. Justice Clifford asserted that the most important and complex
issue of the case was the status of the father-son relationship, especially in light of the fact
that the action had been instituted by "one on the periphery of the" family unit. Id. at
249-52, 330 A.2d at 346-47. Further, he strongly suspected that the child was "being used as
the innocent pawn in an acrimonious dispute between" his father and his maternal grandmother. Id. at 250, 330 A.2d at 346. Judge Conford, temporarily assigned, dissented but
voted to remand in order to determine whether the best interests of the child would be
furthered by an allowance of the wrongful death claim, and indicated that it was "inappropriate
and unfair" for the court to determine the status of the parent-child relationship, since it was not
raised in this action by either party. Id. at 255, 257, 330 A.2d at 349-50. He stated:
I am further in disagreement with the suggestion . . . that a jury verdict in
favor of the plaintiff could justify "further proceedings" for "additional protection"
of the child, if what is meant is termination of the father's custody. On the objective
facts now known or in reasonable prospect of discovery, I am not in accord. On
those facts this child's present and future need for his father should clearly
outweigh a civil jury's adverse appraisal of his conduct in relation to the tragic
episode.
Id. at 257, 330 A.2d at 349-50.
9s The court also recognized that there was a trend in the state's tort law to allow claims
which had once been barred by other common law immunities. Id. at 236-37, 330 A.2d at
338-39. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:1-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76). See also Winters v. City of Jersey
City, 63 N.J. 7, 7-8, 304 A.2d 196, 196 (1973) (in action against city for injuries sustained at
city-owned hospital, statute providing limited liability for nonprofit hospital corporations
held inapplicable); Jackson v. Hankinson, 51 N.J. 230, 235-36, 238 A.2d 685, 688 (1968)
(school district immunity statute would not prevent action instituted by student seriously
injured on school bus); McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 184, 162 A.2d 820, 827
(1960) (municipality liable for injury resulting from negligent or unwarranted shooting
during policeman's course of employment); Logan v. Township of N. Brunswick, 129 N.J.
Super. 105, 110, 322 A.2d 467, 469-70 (App. Div. 1974) (actionable negligence for police
and municipality to allow traffic to proceed over icy bridge); Mayer v. Fairlawn Jewish
Center, 71 N.J. Super. 313, 321, 177 A.2d 40, 44 (App. Div. 1961) (plaintiff whose attendance at religious social center in course of his employment was not a beneficiary of
charitable works within the charitable immunity statute and could sue the center for personal
injuries). Butsee Wiklund v. Presbyterian Church, 90 N.J. Super. 335, 336, 340, 217 A.2d 463,
463, 465 (Passaic County Ct. 1966) (injured Sunday school teacher barred from suing church
for personal injuries since she was beneficiary of the works of the church).
99 66 N.J. at 244, 330 A.2d at 343.
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nity doctrines.' Nevertheless, the court's reference to areas in which
interspousal immunity may still operate-those involving marital
relationship privilege or simple domestic negligence-appears to
indicate an ascertainable standard by which to judge the propriety of
allowing future tort claims between spouses. 1° ' In failing, however, to
delineate a precise standard to guide future courts confronted with
parent-child suits, the court has generated questions regarding the
present scope of parental immunity in New Jersey.
The court noted that somewhat divergent approaches had been
taken by the California and Wisconsin supreme courts in resolving
the issue of the scope of parent-child immunity.1 0 2 However, the
court seemed to favor the approach adopted by the Wisconsin
supreme court in Goller v. White, 10 3 the first case in which parental
immunity had been judicially abrogated.' 0 4 Although abolishing the
immunity, the Goller court evinced a sensitivity to the special role of
parents and therefore found it necessary to outline two exceptions in
which parental status would continue to operate as a defense to the
imposition of tort liability:
(1) [w]here the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental
authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act
involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to
the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental
services, and other care. 10 5
Subsequently, the Wisconsin supreme court determined that these

exceptions were applicable only when the allegedly negligent activity
0
occurred in a parent's attempt to provide necessities.1

6

Id. at 252, 330 A.2d at 347 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
Although the court did not expound on the application of this standard, it is not merely
a reiteration of the position taken in Immer. In Immer, the court found only that special areas
existed which should not be subject to suit. 56 N.J. at 495, 267 A.2d at 488. However, in Small,
the court attempted to more closely define the bounds of those areas. See 66 N.J. at 241, 330
A.2d at 341.
102 66 N.J. at 243, 330 A.2d at 342.
01 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). The disposition of the court can be gleaned not
only from its citation with approval to Gollerand Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d
631 (1968), in which the Goller approach was adopted, but also from the court's use of language
closely resembling that of Goller to describe the areas in which immunity may still operate. See 66
N.J. at 244, 330 A.2d at 343. Compare.id. with 20 Wis. 2d at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
104 See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 922, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr.
288, 293
(1971).
'0
20 Wis. 2d at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
10
See Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629,634-35, 177 N.W.2d 866,869 (1970).
The court's struggle to balance parental liability with the discretion necessary for child
rearing is well illustrated by the reasoning it employed in two post-Goiter cases. In Lemmen v.
Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968), in which a child was injured while crossing a
highway after alighting from a school bus, the court held that the parents were exempt from
100
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Thereafter, when the Supreme Court of California abrogated
parental immunity in Gibson v. Gibson, 10 7 it was highly critical of the
exceptions delineated by the Goller court. While it acknowledged,
as had the Wisconsin court, "that the parent-child relationship is
unique in some aspects,"1 08 the Gibson court strongly objected to
what it perceived as Goller's implications:
First, we think that the Goller view will inevitably result in the
drawing of arbitrary distinctions about when particular parental
conduct falls within or without the immunity guidelines. Second,
we find intolerable the notion that if a parent can succeed in
bringing himself within the "safety" of parental immunity, he
may act negligently with impunity.09
liability for their alleged failure to instruct the child about safety procedures for crossing the
road. The court premised its holding on the ground that the injury was related to the parents'
duty to provide education and thus, within the permissible area "of ordinary parental
discretion." Id. at 77-78, 158 N.W.2d at 343. In an attempt to amplify its meaning, the court
added that "[tlhe immunity is limited to transactions which are essentially parental." Id. at 79,
158 N.W.2d at 344. The expansiveness of this wording, however, proved to be problematic
since it ostensibly encompassed most parental actions within the scope of the immunity.
The problem was resolved in Cole, supra, in which parents answering a counterclaim for
contribution asserted that their supervision over their child's play was "a familial obligation-as
distinct from a general obligation" and therefore involved an essentially parental act of
discretion. 47 Wis. 2d at 632, 177 N.W.2d at 868. While the court did not dispute the
discretionary aspect of supervision, it held that "Goiter limited immunity to a greater degree
than simply acts which are 'essentially parental' in nature." Id. at 633, 177 N.W.2d at 869. In
arriving at the determination that immunity did not protect parents who had allegedly been
negligent in supervising their child, the court never assessed the impact such a suit would have
on family harmony. See id. at 633, 177 N.W.2d at 868-69. The failure of the court to engage in
such an analysis is particularly meaningful in light of its language in Lemmen that
[t]he two exceptions enunciated in Goiter recognize that within the framework of
parental authority and discretion, parents must be accorded immunity from litigation
which in fact would disrupt family harmony and unity.
39 Wis. 2d at 79, 158 N.W.2d at 344. Rather, the court reasoned that parents have legally
sanctioned rights and duties in regard to their children and that immunity should extend only
to those parental actions which are aimed at fulfilling obligations imposed by law. See 47 Wis. 2d
at 633-34, 177 N.W.2d at 869. The court, therefore, held that parents were immune from suit to
the limited extent of employing their discretion in the provision of necessities. Id. at 634-35, 177
N.W.2d at 869.
In subsequent cases, the court has reaffirmed and stressed this interpretation of Goller:
The care sought in the exclusion is not the broad care one gives to a child in
day-to-day affairs. If this were meant, the exclusion would be as broad as the old
immunity was. The exclusion is limited to legal obligations, and a parent who is
negligent in other matters cannot claim immunity simply because he is a parent.
Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 247, 201 N.W.2d 745,
753 (1972). See also Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 261-62, 201 N.W.2d 825, 832 (1972).
107 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
10 Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
I" Id. at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. Interestingly, other jurisdictions
which have adopted the Goller exceptions have seemingly allayed their fears by the simple
addition of the word "reasonable" before "exercise of parental authority" in the first Goller
exception. Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921,923 (Ky. 1970); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1,8,
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The California court, therefore, established a different criterion"what would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have
done in similar circumstances"-to determine when parents should
be subjected to potential liability for their tortious conduct.1 1 l
The primary distinction between the Goller and Gibson approaches rests in the degree to which a suit will be permitted to
proceed, and consequently, the role of the trial judge and jury.
Under the Goller test, it is clear that the judge makes the initial
decision whether to allow the suit. He must determine from the
pleadings whether the parent's conduct falls within the area in
which immunity still operates as a bar to suit. 1 1 If it falls within the
ambit of the immunity, public policy will demand dismissal of the
action on the ground that its allowance would cause conflict between parent and child. However, if the judge finds the conduct to
be outside one of the exceptions, the jury will consider the
"reasonableness" of the conduct in determining liability.
The judge's role under the Gibson standard is not as clear. It
has been suggested that in all cases following Gibson the jury will
decide the reasonableness of the conduct
unless the court can find as a matter of law that no reasonable man
actions, considering his pacould conclude that the defendant's
12
rental role, were unreasonable.
It is the trial judge, therefore, who makes the initial determination
of reasonableness, since he must look at the alleged behavior in
light of the defendant's role as a parent. While this may conform to
the judiciary's traditional role in negligence actions, judges here
may have "more leeway in deciding as a matter of law that a given
defendant should not be exposed to liability" because he is a par199 N.W.2d 169, 172-73 (1972); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431,442, 161 N.W.2d 631, 638
(1968).
It may be likely that the Goller court assumed that a child was sufficiently safeguarded
against unreasonable, injurious conduct inasmuch as the state's right to intervene in situations involving child abuse or neglect is unaffected by parental immunity. However, it is not
inconceivable that a judge might construe the tenor of the delineated exceptions as implying
that only reasonable conduct would be immune from civil liability. Lending credence to this
view is the fact that the second Goller exception exempts from liability only "ordinary
parental discretion," so that any excessive parental behavior would not qualify. 20 Wis. 2d at
413, 122 N.W.2d at 198 (emphasis added).
110 3 Cal. 3d at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (emphasis by the court).
"' See, e.g., Thomas v. Kells, 53 Wis. 2d 141, 148, 191 N.W.2d 872, 875 (1971)
(third-party complaint lacked specificity sufficient to determine at demurrer stage whether
parents' alleged negligence came within the Goller exceptions).
1'2 Note, The Vestiges of Child-Parent Tort Immunity, 6 U.C.D.L. REV. 195, 202-03 (1973)
(emphasis added).
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ent, t t 3 thereby opening the court to charges of arbitrariness. In
the context of intrafarnilial suits, however, a more substantial problem may occur if "trial judges . . . habitually err on the side of

caution" and permit all matters to proceed, 1 4 since this may ultimately engender a conflict between a parent and child which did
not previously exist.
This danger is particularly pronounced in cases in which counterclaims or claims for contribution are asserted against the parents
of an injured child, on the ground that the negligence of the
parent proximately caused the injuries. Since in many of these
cases there will exist no insurance coverage, the threat of draining
family resources is substantial and reduces the validity of the theory
that a successful suit can provide a fund to care for the child's
injuries. Where a child seeks to sue his parent directly, the litigation may be seen as the effect, rather than the cause, of an already
existing disharmony. But this is obviously untrue where the parent
is joined solely by the action of a third party. Furthermore, this is
the area in which the procedural distinctions between the two
approaches have their primary significance. Under the Goller approach, any claims asserted against a parent which fall within his
"ordinary parental discretion" in providing food, clothing, housing,
and other necessities, may be barred at the outset. But a court
following the Gibson approach might well allow all such claims to
be adjudicated, with the consequence of seriously jeopardizing
the family relationship. Though it would appear that the Goller
standard provides a more circumspect approach to limiting the
instances in which a parent may be exposed to liability, there is a
major shortcoming in the implementation of the Goller approach: The
court has failed to give sufficient consideration to the important
rationale underlying the immunity-the preservation of the family
relationship. Evidencing this inadequacy are the number of post-,
Goller Wisconsin cases in which a parent, who had instituted an action
on behalf of his injured child, was ultimately subjected to liability
5
because of his own negligent supervision of that child."1
113 Id. at 203. Arbitrariness may occur because
it is inevitable that a parent . . . will occasionally receive the benefit. of a non-suit,

summary judgment, or directed verdict while an ordinary defendant accused of the
same actions, but standing in no special relation to the plaintiff, would be forced to
prove his lack of negligence to the jury.
Id.
114

Id. at 215-16.

"'

See Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972) (third-party com-

plaint against mother in products liability action for negligently supervising child); Thoreson
v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 20L N.W.2d 745 (1972) (defendant
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A more reasonable approach to the problem of limiting a
parent's liability has recently been taken by the Court of Appeals of
New York in Holodook v. Spencer,"16 wherein it determined that a
parent's negligent supervision of a child would not be cognizable as
"a tort actionable by the child."' "1 7 The court reasoned that although prior New York case law had abrogated parental immunity,
its intent was only to permit "suits between parents and children
which would previously have been actionable between the parties
absent the family relationship."' 18 This prior abrogation was not
intended to create a new substantive cause of action." 9
The court was acutely aware of the problems that would be
generated, particularly in cases involving contribution claims, if the
conduct were deemed tortious. Of paramount concern was the
potentiality of family strife since the family was viewed as "a single
economic unit."'120 Even if care were taken to guarantee that the
parent's contribution was not skimmed from the child's recovery,
family harmony would still be adversely affected.'

21

Furthermore,

a parent might fail to institute a legitimate claim in the child's
sought contribution against mother for negligently supervising child who ran into street and
was struck by bus); Thomas v. Kells, 53 Wis. 2d 141, 191 N.W.2d 872 (1971) (counterclaim
against father and third-party complaint against mother by landlord seeking contribution based
on parents' alleged negligence in allowing child to be on defective rear stairway and on mother's
failure to exercise ordinary care for child's safety); Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629,
177 N.W.2d 866 (1970) (third-party complaint against mother and counterclaim for contribution against father for negligent supervision of child's play); Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis.2d 75,
158 N.W.2d 341 (1968) (third-party complaint against parents for failure to instruct child, hit by
oncoming car, on how to leave school bus and cross highway).
16 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
117 Id. at 51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871-72. The court's holding has no
effect on a parent's liability to a third party injured by the child because of the parent's
failure to supervise his child's activity. See id. at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 343, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
However, the denial of the child's right to sue his parent for negligent supervision defeats
the right of the defendant to contribution.
Because the secondary right to contribution . . .is dependent upon the parent's
alleged failure to perform a duty owing to the plaintiff child, the absence of the
primary cause of action defeats [a] counterclaim and third-party complaint ... and
- ..cross claim . ...
Id. at 51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 872. See also Faul v. Dennis, 118 N.J. Super.
338, 287 A.2d 470 (L. Div. 1972), wherein a crossclaim for contribution against a parent was
barred on the theory that because parental immunity precluded direct suit by a child against his
parent no claim for contribution could be maintained inasmuch as "contribution is derivative."
Id. at 344, 287 A.2d at 473.
118 36 N.Y.2d at 44, 324 N.E.2d at 342, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 866 (emphasis by the court).
19Id. at 40, 324 N.E.2d at 340, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
120 Id. at 47, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
121 Id. at 47, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
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behalf for fear that the alleged tortfeasor would join him as a party
to the action, which in the absence of insurance, would cause substantial hardship.' 2 2
Although the court recognized that under the Goller and Gibson approaches such claims were cognizable, it feared that the
application of either standard to assess a parent's conduct would
undermine that discretion which is essential to parental functioning.1 23 If, in fact, the real policy reason behind the abrogation of
immunity has been to provide the child with the protection available to anyone else, the New York approach may be the most
realistic alternative to date-for those causes of action which are
normally recognized would still be maintainable, while the parent
would also be accorded his traditional leeway in child rearing.
Although the Small court indicated that it was doing no more
than reasserting prior New Jersey law, it seems clear that in so
doing, it emphasized that, in the future, immunity would exist only
in limited circumstances. It is likely therefore, that in the wake of
Small, the court will be faced with intrafamilial claims-including
those which encompass contribution and negligent parental supervision. 124 It will be incumbent upon the court to examine these
issues and the potential ramifications of a total abrogation of parental immunity. It is in precisely these situations that a child,
122 Id. at 46, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 868.

Id. at 49-50, 324 N.E.2d at 345-46, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 870-71.
Intrafamilial litigation may have impact in other areas as well. For instance, a
question of professional ethics was raised in Arizona after that state abrogated parental
immunity. Whether an attorney decides to represent both parent and child in a personal
injury action must be predicated, at least in part, upon the likelihood of the defendant
raising an issue of contributory negligence. See Comment, Streenz v. Streenz: The End of an Era
of ParentalTort Immunity, 13 ARiz. L. REV. 720, 735 (1971). I n a contribution case, the interests of
a child-client might be brought into conflict with the interests of the parent-client and
necessitate that the attorney choose between the conflicting interests. As one commentator
noted:
[S]ince a lawyer's judgment may be affected by either an actual or a potential
divergence in the interests of his clients, the mere possibility of divergence would
make such dual representation improper.
Comment, supra at 735.
Intrafamilial litigation may also warrant changes in the rules of evidence. It must be
noted that the rule of non-disclosure of insurance coverage (NJ.R. EvID. 54) has a potentially strong impact on a jury's determination of liability due to the relationship of the parties
in an intrafamilial dispute. While it is true that a jury's assumptions as to the existence or
non-existence of insurance presents "a potential for injustice" in many negligence cases,
under the circumstances of a parent-child suit "speculation as to the existence of insurance
may be one of the determinative factors in the outcome of the suit." Comment, supra at 737.
See generally id. at 736-38; Note, supra note 112, at 203-04.
123
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with no intent to accuse his parent, may be brought into direct
conflict with that parent due to the action of a third party--one
unrelated to and unconcerned with the effect on the family relationship.
Rochelle Kerner

